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I. Statement of the Case 
This case arises from the Payette County Board of County Commissioners' (the "Board") 
erroneous decision approving a conditional rezone (a rezone subject to a development agreement 
pursuant to I.C. § 67-651 lA) of certain real property in Payette County from an agricultural zone 
designation to an industrial zone designation so that Intervenor Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc. 
("AEHI") could purportedly develop a nuclear power plant on the site. Appellant H-Hook LLC 1 
("H-Hook"), is an adversely affected landowner, who contends that the County's approval of the 
rezone and development agreement is improper because: (i) the conditional rezone was not based 
upon or in accordance with a valid Comprehensive Plan as required by I.C. § 67-6511; (ii) the 
conditional rezone constitutes illegal spot zoning; and (iii) the notice and hearing procedure 
followed by the County in considering the conditional rezone request was defective. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
On or about June 22, 2010, AEHI filed combined applications with Payette County 
seeking (1) a zone change from agriculture to industrial (1-2) under the Payette County Zoning 
Ordinance, (2) approval of a development agreement and (3) a variance from the 125 foot height 
limitation applicable to buildings in the 1-2 zone (Agency Record (Ag. R.) p. 1-1173) for certain 
property in a remote area of Payette County (Ag. R. p. 192-193) owned by J.G. Schwarz (the 
1 Although, Petitioners believe that the District Court's decision concerning the standing of all of 
the Petitioners other than H-Hook was in error, it is not necessary to appeal that decision because 
the District Court found that H-Hook had standing to contest the conditional rezone-a decision 
which neither the Board nor AEHI appealed. Consequently, for ease of reference, only H-Hook 
is referred to as an Appellant in the remainder of the brief. 
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"Schwarz Property") (Ag. R. p. 172, 176). According to the applications, the ostensible purpose 
of the application was to build a nuclear power plant.2 All of those applications were processed, 
noticed and heard together in a single proceeding before the Payette County Planning and Zoning 
Commission ("P&Z Commission") on December 2, 2010. Ag. R. p. 1342-1343. At the close of 
the December 2, 2010, public hearing, the P&Z Commission continued the hearing to 
December 9, 2010, at which time the County Engineer was permitted to offer additional 
testimony (December 9, 2010, Tr. p. 324-346) and the Applicant was allowed to rebut the 
testimony given at the December 2, 2010 hearing. (December 9, 2010, Tr. p. 263-323). The 
P&Z Commission then deliberated and voted to recommend approval of AEHI's applications. 
December 9, 2010, Tr. p. 346-385. The P&Z Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and an Order dated January 13, 2011 (Ag. R. p. 3378-3464). 
The P&Z Commission's decision was appealed to the Board of County Commissioners. 
A hearing was held before the Board on February 21, 2011, at which time the Board announced 
that it would only consider the P&Z Commission's action on the variance as a final decision 
subject to appeal to the Board, the actions on the rezone, development agreement and conceptual 
plan being only recommendations, not subject to appeal. February 21, 2011, Tr. p. 387-397. On 
March 7, 2011, the Board upheld the P&Z Commission's approval of the variance (March 7, 
2 As H-Hook informed the County, it was unclear whether AEHI's purported desire to build the 
plant was part of a stock-fraud scheme. Ag. R. p. 3255, 3259-3261; 3562-3563; 3684-3685. 
H-Hook provided the County with a complaint filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
against AEHI for securities fraud violations related to the proposed plant. Ag. R. p. 3892-3908. 
The lawsuit was filed as Case No. 10-CV-00621-EJL-REB. 
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2011, Tr. p. 427-432) and, on March 14, 2011, the Board issued its written decision regarding the 
variance. Ag. R. p. 3546-3550. Petitioners thereafter timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review 
of the approval of the variance. 
A hearing on AEHI' s rezone and development agreement applications was held before 
the Board on June 6, 2011. Ag. R. p. 4084-4087. Then on June 20, 2011, the Board voted to 
approve the rezone, development agreement and conceptual plan. June 20, 2011, Tr. p. 8. The 
Board issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order dated August 29, 2011. Ag. 
R. p. 4137-4160. On September 23, 2011, 56 Petitioners timely filed a Petition for Judicial 
Review of the approval. R. p. 9. 
On September 13, 2012, the District Court consolidated the petition for judicial review of 
the variance and the petition for judicial review of the conditional rezone "for purposes of 
argument and decision." R. p. 34-37. Oral argument on the two petitions was heard on April 11, 
2013. R. p. 7. On May 2, 2013, the District Court entered an order vacating the granting of the 
variance for a number of reasons. No party has appealed that order. On that same date, the 
District Court entered its Order on Appeal and Order of Remand ("Order") in this case. R. p. 
279-346. H-Hook has appealed from portions of that Order. The Board and AEHI did not appeal 
from any portion of the Order. 
III. Statement of Facts 
Before seeking approval to build in Payette County, AEHI, a Nevada corporation, had 
sought approval to build a nuclear power plant in Owyhee County and then in Elmore County, 
failing in both efforts. Ag. R. p. 1414-1418. In 2009, AEHI turned to Payette County and 
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allegedly contracted to purchase the Schwarz Property. Ag. R. p. 179. The contract, if it exists, 
was not made part of the record. That property was zoned A (agriculture) under the Payette 
County Zoning Ordinance. Ag. R. p. 172. 
The site is located approximately five miles northeast of State Highway 52, north of and 
abutting Big Willow Road, west of and abutting Stone Quarry Road and south of and within a 
mile or so of Little Willow Road. Ag. R. p. 11-14, 3688, 4200. The portion of the site to be 
used for the power plant is located generally north and west of the intersection of Big Willow 
and Stone Quarry Roads. Id Access to the power plant is to be taken from Big Willow, Little 
Willow and Stone Quarry Roads (Ag. R. p. 11, 19, 255, 300, 4131). The proposed power plant 
site is a five-hundred acre parcel which is located within tens of thousands of acres of grazing 
land and generally consists of rolling hills, sagebrush steppe and grasslands. Ag. R. p. 11, 23. 
Testimony at the hearing indicated that the area is poorly suited for a nuclear power plant, or any 
other industrial use, due to its lack of: (i) adequate transportation infrastructure (December 2, 
2010, Tr. p. 53-58, 111-112), (ii) proximity to high voltage electric transmission corridors 
(December 2, 2010, Tr. p. 26-27, 112, 164-171, 179-180, 189-190) and (iii) an adequate supply 
of water (Ag. R. p. 3693-3697), all of which are essential to the operation of a nuclear power 
plant. 
When AEHI allegedly entered into its option to purchase, the site was designated for 
agricultural uses on Payette County's Comprehensive Plan Map, was zoned for agricultural uses 
under Payette County's Zoning Ordinance, and was being used as agricultural grazing land. Ag. 
R. p. 46, 4200. As AEHI stated in its application, "[t]oday, the property surrounding the 
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proposed IEC (Idaho Energy Complex) facility is used for agricultural and livestock grazing. 
The IEC site itself is used as pasture for cattle." Ag. R. p. 23. In fact, there is nothing but 
agricultural land for many miles in every direction from the proposed IEC site. Ag. R. p. 4120, 
4122, 4200. 
Appellant H-Hook is a limited liability company whose members have for more than 
twenty-five years operated a family-owned ranch that directly abuts the east boundary of the 
Schwarz Property. Ag. R. p. 3247-3248, 3660-3662. The H-Hook Ranch shares a continuous, 
boundary with the subject property of approximately 3 ¾ miles. Ag. R. p. 3247-3258, 3688. 
H-Hook Ranch will suffer numerous adverse effects as a result of the approval of the AEHI 
application. 
During the proposed four- to five-year construction period, the nuclear power plant 
construction site may operate up to 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, generating noise, dust, and 
traffic with several thousand workers arriving and departing daily in addition to material 
deliveries. According to AEHI' s transportation consultant, the construction of the power plant 
will add as many as 9,000 vehicle trips per day on Big Willow Road, including over 1,000 
supply/service trucks per day-90 times the existing traffic. Ag. R. p. 648-649. Once in 
operation, the plant will add 900 vehicle trips per day, including 100 truck trips, to Big Willow 
Road-9 times the existing traffic. Id 
Although AEHI's proposal, and the development agreement adopted by the County, 
clearly contemplate that Little Willow Road and Stone Quarry Road, both of which are located, 
in part, on easements on H-Hook's property (Ag. R. p. 3498-3499, 3681-3682), will also be 
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utilized to access the power plant site as a "secondary" and/or "emergency" access (Ag. R. 
p. 4131-4132), AEHI' s Transportation Assessment Summary failed to address traffic impacts on 
those roads. Ag. R. p. 647-652. Because Little Willow Road and Stone Quarry Road provide 
the only feasible route of access to the site and surrounding properties other than Big Willow 
Road (Ag. R. p. 11, 19, 60, 194,255, 300), it is logical to expect that traffic will also increase on 
those roads. H-Hook uses Stone Quarry Road and Little Willow Road for feeding cattle, moving 
cattle and moving farm equipment. Those activities would be adversely affected, or made 
impossible to continue, by the additional traffic. Ag. R. p. 3247-3257, 3660-3665. 
The ranch also operates a feedlot for weaner calves at the comer of Little Willow Road 
and Stone Quarry road for three months of the year. This feedlot is approximately 1/2 mile from 
the Northeast comer of the Schwarz Property. Continuous traffic, and the associated dust and 
noise, to and from an industrial site would severely impact the feedlot's operation and could 
render it unusable. Id. 
In addition, two of the H-Hook ranch homes are located on the unpaved Stone Quarry 
Road. The use of the roads as industrial thoroughfares would adversely affect the use and 
enjoyment of these properties. The other H-Hook ranch employees and their families live nearby 
in homes located on Little Willow Road. H-Hook will not be able to continue its ranching 
operations if it is unable to retain qualified farm and ranch workers because the entire Little 
Willow Creek area will become less desirable for residences due to the adverse effects caused by 
the proposed power plant and related activities. Id. 
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The negative impact on the value of the area's existing agricultural and residential 
properties, including H-Hook, is incalculable. If any owner in the area near the proposed site, 
including H-Hook, desires to sell its real property now or in the future, the uncertainty 
surrounding the construction and eventual operation of the nuclear power plant adversely affects 
the marketability and value of such real property for at least the duration of the twenty-year 
period of the development agreement under which AEHI is allowed to develop the power plant, 
and forever if the power plant is built. Id. 
H-Hook and many other affected persons (including the other petitioners in the appeal to 
the District Court) reside in or own property in the "Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency 
Planning Zone" (the "Emergency Planning Zone") of the proposed nuclear power plant as 
determined by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency 
Management Administration. Ag. R. p. 3467-3480, 3666-3667. The Emergency Planning Zone 
is the zone encompassed by the area within the radius of a ten mile circle from the proposed 
nuclear power plant. 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. 
If the proposed power plant is constructed, Payette County and the cities of Payette, 
Fruitland, and New Plymouth will be required to have in place systems and procedures to alert 
residents and others in the Emergency Planning Zone ( emergency broadcasts, sirens and other 
such methods). In the event of an emergency all persons in the Emergency Planning Zone may 
be evacuated. 10 CFR 50.47. The residents living and working within the Emergency Planning 
Zone will not only be required to evacuate their homes, but also to leave behind their 
possessions, pets, and livestock. 
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AEHI' s proposed nuclear power plant could not be built on the Schwarz Property while it 
was zoned agricultural because such a use is prohibited under Payette County's zoning 
ordinance. AEHI also could not rezone the Schwarz Property for industrial uses because that 
property and all the surrounding properties were designated as agricultural lands on Payette 
County's Comprehensive Plan Map. Ag. R. p. 4200. In October 2009, AEHI sought to amend 
the Payette County Comprehensive Plan Map to designate the Schwarz Property for industrial 
uses. Ag. R. p. 93. The Petitioners objected to the proposed amendment because the County's 
Comprehensive Plan did not include the " ... analysis showing general plans for. .. power plant 
sites ... " as required by LC. § 67-6508(h) and recommended that the County perform the required 
planning for power plant sites and utility transmission corridors before considering an 
amendment to the Comprehensive Plan Map. Ag. R. p. 124-127. The Board rejected the 
recommendation and, to avoid the evaluation and planning process required under the Local 
Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA"), approved an amendment to the text of the County's 
Comprehensive Plan (Ag. R. p. 140-142), adding the following sentence: "Energy producers who 
wish to locate electric, gas or other energy production facilities in Payette County must apply to 
the Payette County Planning and Zoning Department and each application will be considered on 
an individual basis in accordance in accordance (sic) with the Local Land Use Planning Act 
(LC.§ 67-6500 et seq.), Payette County Code and this plan." Ag. R. p. 141-143, 153. A few 
months later, AEHI filed the application which is the subject of this appeal. Ag. R. p. 166. 
Prior to the December 2, 2010, hearing before the P&Z Commission, a notice was 
published in the newspaper and purportedly mailed to neighboring property owners. Neither the 
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mailed notice nor the published notice contained a "summary of the proposal" as required by 
Payette County Code § 8-9-6 and failed to state that the proposed use of the property was for a 
nuclear power plant. Ag. R. p. 1342-1343. The hearing notice did, however, include a directive 
requiring that any written testimony, exhibits or written documentation that an interested party 
wanted included in the record must be submitted to the Planning and Zoning office one week 
before the hearing date. This notice was in direct conflict with the County's ordinance which 
allows interested persons to produce information at the hearing either orally or in written form, 
without any time limitations or requirements. Payette County Code § 1-7-2A. 
The P&Z Commission took public testimony at the hearing, but limited oral presentations 
by H-Hook and other members of the public to five minutes each. AEHI, on the other hand, was 
allowed fifteen minutes. Ag. R. p. 1344. The P&Z Commission continued the hearing to the 
following week, at which time the County Engineer was permitted to offer additional testimony 
(December 9, 2010, Tr. p. 324-346) and the AEHI was permitted unlimited time to rebut 
(December 9, 2010, Tr. p. 263-323). H-Hook and other appellants had no opportunity to reply. 
The P&Z Commission then deliberated and voted to recommend approval of AEHI's 
applications. December 9, 2010, Tr. p. 346-385. 
H-Hook, together with other persons and organizations, appealed the P&Z Commission's 
decision to the Board of County Commissioners pursuant to Payette County Code § 8-18-3, 
raising a number of issues in addition to the question of whether the granting of the variance was 
permitted under applicable law including that: (i) the Payette County Comprehensive Plan did 
not include the required analysis and general plan for power plant sites; (ii) the rezoning of the 
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applicant's property constituted spot zoning; (iii) the process and the decision of the P&Z 
Commission deprived them of their right to procedural due process, including the specific 
process and notice requirements of LLUPA; (iv) because due process requires such procedural 
protections that are warranted by the particular situation, the complex and voluminous 
application before the County required that the applicant be held to higher standards (it should be 
noted, however, that the County did not meet even the minimum requirements, especially the 
requirement for meaningful notice); (v) the notice of hearing did not contain the required 
summary of AEHI's proposal; (vi) the application was not made available to the public for 
review in a readily available and convenient form and manner; (vii) the application remained 
incomplete until Wednesday, November 24, just prior to Thanksgiving Day; and (viii) because of 
the County's requirement that all written submissions to the Commission must be made five days 
before the hearing, those persons who wished to make comments for the record essentially had 
only one day to review the voluminous application and prepare written comments. Ag. R. 
p. 3486-3504. 
H-Hook also requested that the Board reverse the decision of the P&Z Commission and 
issue an order that if another application was submitted by AEHI, the County require the 
following to ensure adequate and meaningful notice before any hearing: (i) that the application 
must be complete prior to notice of the hearing; (ii) that the notice be published and mailed sixty 
days prior to the hearing; (iii) that the notice include a description of the property and a summary 
of the actions to be considered at the hearing; (iv) that the notice be sent by mail to all Payette 
County residences and businesses within the ten-mile radius of the Emergency Planning Zone; 
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(v) that the notice state that any interested party may obtain a copy of the application from the 
P&Z Commission; and (vi) that AEHI be required to provide sufficient copies of the entire 
application to all persons requesting a copy. Id. 
After holding a hearing on the appeal, the Board announced its decision upholding the 
P&Z Commission's approval of the variance (March 7, 2011, Tr. p. 427-432) and thereafter 
issued its \Vritten decision. Ag. R. p. 3546-3550. H-Hook then timely filed a Petition for 
Judicial Review of the approval of the variance. 
A hearing on AEHI' s conditional rezone application was scheduled before the Board for 
June 6, 2011. Ag. R. p. 4088. A notice of that hearing was published in the newspaper and 
apparently mailed to several neighboring property owners. As with the P&Z Commission's 
notice, no summary of the proposal was included. Ag. R. p. 4081, 4084. The entire notice and 
hearing procedure before the Board was, as described below, essentially the same as the process 
before the P&Z Commission. Neither AEHI nor the County made any changes in the notice or 
the procedure, despite H-Hook's request discussed above. 
As indicated above, as a part of its rezone application, AEHI requested that the County 
enter into a development agreement pursuant to LC.§ 67-651 lA and Payette County 
Code § 8-5-11. The development agreement is intended to, among other matters, set forth the 
conditions upon which a rezone might be granted and is, thus, a critical element of AEHI' s 
application. The P&Z Commission's published notice of its December hearing declared that a 
proposed development agreement would be added to the public record by November 17, 2010 
(Ag. R. p. 1342), a week after the notice was published. Ag. R. p. 1343. That development 
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agreement, however, was not actually included in the public record and made available for public 
review, until November 24, 2010, one day before the Thanksgiving holiday, two days before the 
cutoff date for written comment and just eight days before the public hearing. Ag. R. p. 3255. 
This failure to timely file the proposed development agreement made it essentially impossible for 
H-Hook to comment on the most important document in the application. 
The failure to timely submit the development agreement for public review was repeated 
in the proceedings before the Board. The proposed development agreement, as revised after the 
date of the P&Z Commission's recommendation for approval, was not prepared and made 
available for review by members of the public until May 26, 2011, when it was released with the 
County Staff Report only 11 days prior to the June 6 hearing date. Ag. R. p. 4028-4029. 
The Board took public testimony at the hearing, but limited oral presentations by 
members of the public to five minutes each. AEHI was allowed 15 minutes. June 6, 2011, 
Tr. p. 7. However, after public testimony was completed, and the Board had announced there 
would be no more testimony (June 6, 2011, Tr. p. 111), the Board invited AEHI to make a 
presentation regarding the then recent disaster at Japan's Fukushima nuclear power plant. 
During that presentation, AEHI spoke at length about the Payette County site and the differences 
from the Fukushima site as well as made claims concerning the United States' nuclear regulatory 
system's superiority. June 6, 2011, Tr. p. 111-126. The Board questioned AEHI about its 
proposal and the events in Japan. June 6, 2011, Tr. p. 124-129. Effectively, the Board allowed 
AEHI to make not one but two presentations in support of its application. However, H-Hook and 
others members of the public had no opportunity to respond. 
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IV. Issues Presented on Appeal 
A. Whether the District Court erred when it determined that the rezone is valid 
because: 
1. The rezone is based upon an invalid comprehensive plan; and 
2. The rezone constitutes illegal spot zoning? 
B. Whether the District Court erred when it determined the notice and hearing 
procedure followed by Payette County in considering the rezone request was not defective? 
C. Whether H-Hook should be awarded its attorney fees and costs pursuant to 
I.C. § 12-117? 
V. Argument 
A. Standard of Review 
"The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (I.A.P.A.) governs the review of local zoning 
decisions." Price v. Payette County Bd o_fCounty Com'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 
586 (1998); see also Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000). "In 
an appeal from the decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity under the I.A.P.A., 
the Court reviews the [administrative] record independently of the district court's decision." 
Price, 131 Idaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586; see also Urrutia, 134 Idaho at 357, 2 P.3d at 742. "The 
Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence 
presented." Price, 131 Idaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586 (citing LC. § 67-5279(1)); see also Urrutia, 
134 Idaho at 357, 2 P.3d at 742. "Rather, the Court should defer to the agency's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous." Price, 131 Idaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586; see also Urrutia, 
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134 Idaho at 357, 2 P.3d at 742. The Court freely reviews the district court's conclusions oflaw, 
Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. ofCom'rs, 151 Idaho 228,231,254 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2011), 
including whether the Board violated a statutory provision. Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley 
County, 137 Idaho 192, 196, 46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002). 
B. The District Court Erred in Determining that The Rezone is Valid 
There are few land uses and land use decisions that are as significant and have the 
potential to cause greater harm to neighboring property owners' land values and use and 
enjoyment of their properties than the siting of a nuclear power plant. In this case, the Board 
erred by granting the rezone for such a use and the District Court perpetuated that error when it 
determined that the rezone is valid. As set forth below, the rezone should not have been 
approved because it is based on an invalid Comprehensive Plan and because it is quintessential 
spot zoning. 
1. The Rezone is Invalid Because it is Based upon an Invalid Comprehensive 
Plan. 
LC. § 67-6508 makes it the duty of each planning and zoning commission "to conduct a 
comprehensive planning process designed to prepare, implement, review and update a 
comprehensive plan." In particular: 
"[t]he plan shall include all land within the jurisdiction of the governing board. 
The plan shall consider previous and existing conditions, trends, compatibility of 
land uses, desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future situations for each 
planning component. The plan with maps, charts, and reports shall be based on 
the following components as they may apply to land use regulations and actions 
unless the plan specifies reasons why a particular component is unneeded." 
[ emphasis added] 
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Id I.C. § 67-6508 then lists sixteen components that are required to be addressed in the plan, 
including public services, facilities and utilities. The public services, facilities and utilities 
component requires the following: 
Id 
"(h) Public Services, Facilities, and Utilities-an analysis showing general plans 
for sewage, drainage, power plant sites, utility transmission corridors, water 
supply, fire stations and firefighting equipment, health and welfare facilities, 
libraries, solid waste disposal sites, schools, public safety facilities and related 
services. The plan may also show locations of civic centers and public 
buildings." [ emphasis added] 
Payette County adopted its comprehensive plan in May 2006. Ag. R. p. 4167. The public 
facilities and services component of Payette County's plan is found in Part 9, beginning on 
page 55. That component addresses sewer and water, fire and safety, public health, public 
schools, libraries, solid waste management, utilities and communications. At the time AEHI 
submitted its application to amend Payette County's comprehensive plan map, Section 9 .2. 7 .1 
entitled "Electric Power and Gas" merely provided: 
"Electric power is available to all county residents through Idaho Power 
Company. Electricity is generated by hydroelectric facilities located at Brownlee, 
Oxbow, and Hells Canyon Dams on the Snake River, adjacent to Washington 
County. Electric rates are much lower than the national average ( City of 
Fruitland 2004a). 
"Intermountain Gas provides natural gas services. Grants Petroleum in 
Fruitland provides home heating fuel to residences throughout Payette County. 
Several local vendors provide propane for heating purposes (City of Fruitland 
2004a)." 
Ag. R. p. 4234. Entirely missing from Payette County's comprehensive plan was any analysis of 
or plans for potential power plant sites and utility transmission corridors. No consideration in the 
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County's comprehensive plan was given to trends, compatibility of land uses, desirable goals and 
objectives, or desirable future situations concerning power plant siting or utility transmission 
corridors. The matter was simply unaddressed. 
AEHI applied for an amendment to the Payette County comprehensive plan map in 2009 
seeking to have approximately 5,000 acres of land then designated for agricultural uses changed 
to permit industrial uses so that AEHI purportedly could construct its proposed nuclear power 
plant on that land. Ag. R. p. 93-152. During that process, H-Hook told the Board that the 
County's comprehensive plan was defective because it did not include the analysis showing 
general plans for potential power plant sites and utility transmission corridors as required by 
LC. § 67-6508 and recommended that the Board initiate the required comprehensive plan 
amendment process to remedy the defect. Ag. R. p. 3853-3856. Instead of doing so, however, 
the Board continued its hearing on the proposed amendment to a later date and invited AEHI and 
other interested parties to propose "potential textual changes" to the comprehensive plan to 
address the missing element. Ag. R. p. 3863-3868. Two weeks later, the Board reconvened and 
approved AEHI's request to amend the County's comprehensive plan map and adopted an 
amendment to the text of Section 9.2.7.1 of the County's comprehensive plan which merely 
added the following: 
"Energy producers who wish to locate electric, gas, or other energy production 
facilities in Payette County must apply to the Payette County Planning and 
Zoning Department and each application will be considered on an individual basis 
in accordance in accordance (sic) with the Local Land Use Planning Act 
(LC. § 67-6500 et seq.) Payette County Code and this plan." 
Ag. R. p. 3883. 
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Thus, Payette County's approach to planning for and analyzing potential power plant 
sites, including consideration of trends, compatibility of land uses, desirable goals and objectives 
and desirable future situations was to make those decisions on an ad hoc, case by case basis. In 
other words, the County specifically refused to plan for power plant sites and utility transmission 
corridors in blatant disregard of the requirements of LC.§ 67-6508. 
A little over a year later, the Board approved the rezone which is the subject of this 
appeal, finding that the proposed rezone is "not in conflict with the comprehensive plan." Ag. 
R. p. 4156-4160. Because the County's comprehensive plan, both before and after its 
amendment, clearly violates the requirements of LC. § 67-6508, the County's action m 
approving AEHI's rezone request must be invalidated. 
Idaho law is clear that a rezone is invalid if based upon an invalid comprehensive plan. 
In Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 986 P.2d 343 (1999), the 
City of Hailey adopted an ordinance rezoning a parcel of property and the owner of the property 
objected arguing that the rezone ordinance was invalid because Hailey's comprehensive plan, 
upon which the rezone ordinance was based, did not contain all components required by LLUP A 
The city's comprehensive plan, the owner noted, contained neither a land use map nor a property 
rights component, both required by I.C. § 67-6508. This court agreed with the owner saying: 
"In Love v. Bd ofCty. Com'rs of Bingham, 105 Idaho 558, 671 P.2d 471 
(1983 ), this Court stated ' [ t ]he enactment of a comprehensive plan is a 
precondition to the validity of zoning ordinances.' Id. at 559, 671 P.2d at 472 
(citing LC.§ 67-6511). Although not explicitly stated in Love, it necessarily 
follows that a valid comprehensive plan is a precondition to the validity of zoning 
ordinances." 
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133 Idaho 321. 
This court also noted that LC. § 67-6508 requires comprehensive plans to be based on all 
of the components listed in that Code section unless the plan specifies a reason why a particular 
component is unneeded: 
"This language is clear, unambiguous, and unmistakably mandatory. Thus, we 
conclude that a valid comprehensive plan must contain each of the components as 
specified in § 67-6508, unless the plan articulates a reason why a particular 
component is unneeded." 
Id. at 321. Accordingly, this court held that Hailey's comprehensive plan, as it existed when the 
rezone ordinance was adopted, did not comply with LLUP A, and that the rezone ordinance was 
therefore invalid. The same situation exists here. Payette County's comprehensive plan 
contained neither the statutorily required analysis of power plant sites and utility transmission 
corridors nor a plan for the siting of them when the Board approved the rezone of the Schwarz 
Property from agriculture to industrial. 
AEHI and the County argued to the District Court that the adoption of a comprehensive 
plan is a legislative act entitled to great deference, apparently hoping that, by so labeling the 
County's action, the Court would not hold the County to the standard required by LC. § 67-6508. 
In support of that proposition, AEHI and the County cited to Cooper v. Bd. of County Com 'rs of 
Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980) and Gay v. County Com'rs of Bonneville 
County, 103 Idaho 626, 651 P.2d 560 (1982). Neither case, however, provides support for the 
proposition that the Court should defer to a county's legislative action in adopting a 
comprehensive plan which fails to conform to the requirements of the applicable statute. 
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Cooper was an appeal of Ada County's denial of Cooper's and Edmunds' application for 
a rezone. The denial was overturned due to the failure of Ada County to afford Cooper and 
Edmunds procedural due process. Although the Court discussed the distinction between 
legislative actions, such as the adoption of comprehensive plans, which are subject to limited 
review by the courts, and quasi-judicial actions, such as granting rezones, which are subject to 
greater review, nowhere in that case did the court hold that counties are free to ignore the 
requirements of LC. § 67-6508 in the adoption of their comprehensive plans. Similarly, Gay was 
an appeal from Bonneville County's approval of the construction of a fertilizer storage and 
blending facility in an agricultural zone. Relying on Cooper, the court concluded that approving 
a change of authorized land use is a quasi-judicial action requiring the application of procedural 
due process protections and that the county had failed to provide such protections in granting that 
approval. Like the Cooper case, however, nowhere did the court suggest that counties are not 
required to conform to the requirements of LC. § 67-6508 in adopting their comprehensive plans. 
In any event, whatever deference the County may be entitled to in the adoption of its 
comprehensive plan does not extend to the County's failure to include in its plan a statutorily 
required element. The law in this state is clear that: "... a valid comprehensive plan must 
contain each of the components as specified in section 67-6508." Sprenger, Grubb & 
Associates. 13 3 Idaho at 3 21. If it does not, the plan is invalid and any zoning ordinance adopted 
under it is invalid. Id. 
AEHI and the County also argued to the District Court that the County's comprehensive 
plan as originally written in 2006 does, in fact, include an analysis showing general plans for 
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power plant sites. In support, they point to language which acknowledges that Idaho Power 
supplies electricity in Payette County and that electricity is generated by several hydroelectric 
facilities in the region (including a power plant not mentioned in the comprehensive plan), and 
asked the District Court to conclude that such treatment of the topic satisfies the statutory 
planning requirement. The comprehensive plan, they argue, is not a facility siting statute. 
H-Hook has never called for the County to adopt a facility siting statute. However, to 
comply with the statute, some effort must be made to include provisions in the plan to guide the 
siting of power plants. The County should be required to fulfill its statutory duty to "consider 
previous and existing conditions, trends, compatibility of land uses, desirable goals and 
objectives, or desirable future situations for each planning component" including "an analysis 
showing general plans for ... power plant sites ... ". I.C. § 67-6508. Compliance with the 
statute's requirement to plan for power plant sites is not achieved by providing that applications 
for power plant sites be addressed on a case by case basis without any prior planning. In 
adopting this ad hoc approach to approving power plant sites, the County has, in fact, expressly 
refused to plan for such facilities in direct contravention of the requirements of this statute. 
There is simply no other way to describe the County's approach to the issue. As a result, under 
the holding of Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, the County's comprehensive plan is invalid and 
the rezone of the subject property is likewise invalid. 
The District Court took another approach to justify the defective comprehensive plan. 
Instead of focusing on whether the plan meets the requirements of the statute, the District Court 
invented a speculative reason which justified, in the District Court's opinion, the plan's failure to 
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comply with the statute. Specifically, it concluded that the directive of LC. § 67-6508 that the 
County plan for power plant sites simply requires the County to address how it would deal with 
power plant siting as a whole. The Court then acknowledged that before the 2010 Amendment, 
the County's comprehensive plan included no provision for power plant siting, "presumably 
because the power needs were being sufficiently met by plants located outside the county and 
therefore, there was no need to have power plant siting within the county." Order on Appeal and 
Order of Remand, p. 34 (R. p. 312). The Court went on to conclude that once there was a 
request to locate a power plant within the County, the comprehensive plan was statutorily 
required to have a provision addressing power plant siting. Payette County's ad hoc approach to 
planning for power plant sites is sufficient, the Court said, because "[i]ntending to address the 
requests as requests are made is a 'general' plan." Id. at p. 35 (R. p. 313). The District Court 
concluded that a comprehensive plan which does not include any planning at all, but simply 
directs that applications will be considered as they are submitted constitutes a general plan. 
The District Court is clearly incorrect for several reasons. First, the District Court 
misreads the specific requirements of I.C. § 67-6508(h). What that section specifically requires 
is "an analysis showing general plans for ... power plant sites .... " In that sentence, the phrase 
"showing general plans" serves as an adjective to modify the noun "analysis." That section 
requires "an analysis ... for power plant sites", not merely a general plan. The element specified 
in LC. § 67-6508(h), and the one missing from the County's comprehensive plan, is "an 
analysis ... for power plant sites." Even if it were debatable whether the amendment to the text of 
the comprehensive plan adopted by the County constitutes a general plan as the District Court 
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concluded (a proposition that H-Hook rejects), it is certainly clear that the amendment does not 
in any way meet the requirement of "an analysis" since the entire purpose of the amendment is to 
avoid any planning or analysis. 
The District Court's conclusion is also incorrect because it failed to recognize that a 
comprehensive plan is required to reflect the desirable goals and objectives or desirable future 
situations of the use of land (I.C. § 67-6508) and is intended to guide and advise the 
governmental agencies responsible for making zoning decisions. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 
Idaho 353, 357-358, 2 P.3d 738, 742-743 (2000); Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 850, 
693 P.2d 1046 (1984). The ad hoc approach approved by the District Court, however, begs the 
question how does Payette County's comprehensive plan reflect the desirable goals and 
objectives, or desirable future conditions, surrounding placement of power plants? Moreover, 
how does Payette County's current comprehensive plan guide and advise those responsible for 
making the decision to zone land for a power plant? The answer is that it does neither. Payette 
County's approach refuses to state any goals or objectives or desirable conditions and refuses to 
provide guidance and/or advice to zoning decision makers. Instead, Payette County's treatment 
of planning for power plant sites is not to plan. 
In addressing the requirement of I.C. § 67-6511 that zoning be in accordance with the 
policies adopted in the comprehensive plan, this Court has often said that the governing body 
charged with zoning must make a factual inquiry to determine whether the requested rezone 
reflects the goals of, and takes into account those factors in, the comprehensive plan in light of 
the present factual situation surrounding the request. Ferguson v. Bd. of County Com 'rs for Ada 
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County, 110 Idaho 785, 787, 718 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1986); Bone v. City of Lewiston, supra, at 
850. The approach approved by the District Court permits the County to make the zoning 
decision without an inquiry to determine whether the zone change reflects the goals of the 
comprehensive plan, because no such goals for the proposed use are stated in the plan. The 
comprehensive land use planning process for power plant sites is skipped. Accordingly, Payette 
County's comprehensive plan fails to conform to the requirements of I.C. § 67-6508 and is 
therefore, invalid. 
Finally, the District Court suggests the County should not be required to plan for power 
plant sites because "[ u ]nless and until the Board had information about the type of power plant to 
be sited in Payette County, the Board would be ill-equipped to try to anticipate the size, type, and 
other relevant factors to designate where, in Payette County, such a plant could be sited." Order 
on Appeal and Order of Remand, p. 34 (R. p. 312). According to the District Court, different 
types of power plants will have different needs. The problem with this approach is that it can be 
utilized with any land use and thus, effectively eliminate the requirement to plan. If the District 
court's approach were accepted, a county could simply determine that it cannot plan for 
residential uses unless it knows, by an application having been filed, if the residential use 
contemplates apartments or single family homes; or a county could determine that it cannot plan 
for commercial uses unless it knows, from an application having been filed, if the commercial 
use is a shopping mall or a bowling alley. 
The approach adopted by the District Court thus creates a loophole through which the 
entire planning process can escape. It reduces the statutory planning process to a nullity. And, 
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in any event, it is not the District Court which is empowered to determine which of the statutorily 
required elements the County's comprehensive plan should include. That is for the legislature to 
decide, and the legislature did decide that each comprehensive plan must include all of the 
elements listed in LC. § 67-6508, including an analysis showing general plans for power plant 
sites. For these reasons, the District Court's determination that the rezone is valid should be 
overturned. 
2. The Rezoning Constitutes Illegal Spot Zoning. 
There are two types of illegal spot zoning. Type one spot zoning is a rezoning of 
property for a use prohibited by the original zoning classification that is not in accordance with 
the comprehensive plan. Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 77, 73 P.3d 84, 90 (2003). Type 
two spot zoning is a zoning change that singles out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the 
permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit of an individual property owner. 
Id.; see also Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 515, 567 P.2d 1257, 1266 
( 1977). Both types of illegal spot zoning have occurred in this case. 
a. The Rezone Constitutes Type One Illegal Spot Zoning 
The District Court erred when it found that the rezone was in accord with the County's 
amended comprehensive plan and that therefore, there was no type one spot zoning. The District 
Court found that the amendment to the comprehensive plan rendered the plan "valid" and 
therefore, that the Board did not engage in type one spot zoning because the conditional rezone 
was granted consistent with the comprehensive plan. Order on Appeal and Order of Remand, 
p. 36 (R. p. 314). The District Court's ruling is in error because the manner in which the 
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comprehensive plan was amended to authorize the project, as described above, in and of itself 
violates the spirit of the rules against spot zoning. Indeed, it could be said that the 
comprehensive plan was "spot" amended because it was amended at the request of AEHI 
specifically to allow for a rezone to take place for a use that was inconsistent with the permitted 
uses in the rest of the zoning district solely for the benefit of AEHI. Ag. R. p. 93-152. 
In fact, the invalid amendment to the comprehensive plan, in application, mandates that 
sites for power plants be "spot zoned." That amendment provides that "( e ]nergy producers who 
wish to locate electric, gas or other energy production facilities in Payette County must apply to 
the Payette County Planning and Zoning Department and each application will be considered on 
an individual basis in accordance in accordance (sic) with the Local Land Use Planning Act 
(I.C. § 67-6500 et seq.), Payette County Code and this plan." Ag. R. p. 153-154. Thus, under 
the improper amendment, there is no power plant provision that the rezone can be in accord with 
because Payette County declined to plan for power plants. Consequently, the rezone is invalid as 
type one spot zoning. 
The District Court's tacit finding that the amendment authorizes the rezone also must be 
rejected. It conflicts with the language of the amendment because under the District Court's 
interpretation, Payette County would have free reign to engage in type one spot zoning for power 
plants due to the fact that under the amendment, power plants can be located anywhere. There is 
no zone that is off limits. Under this erroneous interpretation, all a power plant developer has to 
do is request a rezone and that rezone will conform to this improper amendment of the 
comprehensive plan. 
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Moreover, it is clear that this amendment was requested by AEHI to specifically 
authorize its plan to engage in illegal spot zoning. Ag. R. p. 93-152. AEHI, however, should not 
be permitted to circumvent the prohibitions on spot zoning, by amending the comprehensive plan 
to allow spot zoning to occur. Accordingly, the Court should reverse the District Court's 
decision and hold that the spot zoning that was performed pursuant to the invalid comprehensive 
plan is improper. 
b. The Rezone Constitutes Type Two Illegal Spot Zoning 
The District Court erred when it found that there was no type two spot zoning because the 
rezone met the type one test. As set forth above, the rezone does not meet the type one test, and 
even if it did, it is still invalid under the type two test, which this Court has not abrogated. Evans 
v. Teton County, 139 Idaho at 77, 73 P.3d at 90. 
(i). The rezone is undisputedly type two spot zoning 
The spot zoning that occurred in this case is quintessential type two spot zoning as the 
evidence showed that the area was rural, that the zoning classification of the subject parcel was 
agricultural and that the surrounding area was agricultural for miles, yet the property was 
rezoned to heavy industrial solely for the benefit of AEHI. Ag. R. p. 23, 46, 4120, 4122, 4200. 
Moreover, the Comprehensive Plan Map demonstrates that the majority of the land surrounding 
the Schwarz property and proposed nuclear site is nearly all designated as agricultural. Id. at 
p. 4200 Likewise there was no evidence that (1) there was "selective or discriminatory 
application of the zoning ordinance to the particular property in question"; (2) the owner made "a 
primafacie case of umeasonableness" or (3) "the use was incident to a valid non-conforming use 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF, Page 26 
which pre-existed the zoning ordinance in question." Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 
98 Idaho 506, 515, 567 P.2d 1257, 1266 (1977). 
Instead, the rezone impermissibly singled out a parcel of land and changed the 
classification from agricultural to "I-2 (Heavy Industrial)", contrary to the agricultural 
classification of the surrounding area, for the benefit of AEHI, "thereby permitting a use of that 
parcel inconsistent with the use permitted in the rest of the district ... merely for private gain." 
Id.; see also Balser v. Kootenai County Bd. of Com'rs, 110 Idaho 37, 714 P.2d 6 (1986) 
(landowner not entitled to change existing zone classification from agricultural to industrial 
where, among other things, the requested zone change was of an isolated parcel in the midst of 
other agricultural parcels). As such, the rezone is invalid as it is classic "type two" spot zoning. 
Indeed, below, neither AEHI nor the Board even argued that the area had changed. Instead, they 
tried to take advantage of their illegal amendment to the Comprehensive Plan by arguing that 
there could be no type two spot zoning because the zoning was in accord with the 
Comprehensive Plan. Respondent and Intervenor's Brief at 19-20. (R. p. 118-119). 
Likewise, the District Court did not address whether the rezone "single[ d] out a parcel of 
land for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit of 
an individual property owner." Evans, 139 Idaho at 76, 73 P.3d at 89. Instead, without any 
analysis, the District Court improperly found that there was no need to address whether there was 
type two spot zoning because "the type one spot zoning was valid." Order on Appeal and Order 
of Remand p. 36 (R. p. 314). This ruling must be in error because it would make type two spot 
zoning a nullity in that if a zoning decision meets the type one test it is valid and if it does not 
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meet the type one test, there is no need to determine the spot zone's validity under type two spot 
zoning because it is invalid under type one.3 This Court, however, has not evinced any intention 
to make type two spot zoning a nullity. 
(ii). This Court has not rendered type two spot zoning a nullity 
The District Court appears to have relied on this Court's decision in Taylor v. Canyon 
County Bd. ofCom'rs, 147 Idaho 424,210 P.3d 532 (2009) for its erroneous ruling that it need 
not address whether there was a type two spot zoning violation. If so, the District Court was 
mistaken because the Taylor decision did not abrogate or otherwise make type two spot zoning a 
nullity. In fact, the Taylor decision confirmed the analysis originally set forth in Evans. Id. at 
436-37, 210 P.3d at 544-545. The Taylor court, quoting the Evans decision, reaffirmed that there 
are two distinct types of spot zoning and that "'the test for whether type one spot zoning is valid 
is whether the zone change is in accord with the comprehensive plan"' and that a zoning change 
may still be prohibited as type two spot zoning if the change "singles out a parcel of land for use 
inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit of an 
3 Indeed, the District Court's ruling would make all claims of spot zoning (both type one and type 
two) a nullity with regard to power plants in Payette County. It creates a "Catch 22" for the 
victims of spot zoning by forming a paradoxical situation from which the victim of spot zoning 
cannot escape because of the contradictory rules laid down by the District Court. Said 
differently, because the District Court approved the Board's amendment of the comprehensive 
plan where there is no planning for power plants, but instead power plant applications are 
considered on an individual basis, a power plant application will always be in accord with the 
comprehensive plan and therefore, there can never be a type one spot zoning violation for power 
plants. And because there can never be a type one spot zoning violation, there can never be a 
type two spot zoning violation under the District Court's ruling that type two spot zoning cannot 
exist where there is no type one spot zoning violation. Accordingly, under the District Court's 
ruling, there is no spot zoning of any type in Payette County when it comes to power plants. 
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individual property owner." Id at 436,210 P.3d at 544 (quoting Evans, 139 Idaho at 77, 73 P.3d 
at 90). 
The District Court's decision, however, appears to accept AEHI's argument below that 
the Taylor decision stands for the proposition that there is no type two spot zoning in Idaho 
because a court need not consider whether type two spot zoning occurred if the spot zone meets 
the type one spot zone test. That interpretation of Taylor misreads the decision. Contrary to the 
District Court's decision, this Court in Taylor held that the only spot zoning at issue in the case 
was type one spot zoning and that the type one spot zoning that occurred was valid because it 
was in conformance with the comprehensive plan. Id. at 437, 210 P.3d at 545. Specifically the 
Court stated that "the Vickers' claim of spot zoning need not be addressed since the type one 
spot zoning that occurred in this case is valid." Id The Court agreed with Canyon County that 
"only type one spot zoning occurred in [the] case." Id at 436, 210 P.3d at 544. In other words, 
type two spot zoning was not at issue in Taylor. Thus, the Taylor decision is distinguishable on 
the facts. The Court in Taylor did not hold that type two spot zoning should not be considered if 
the spot zone meets the type one test, but instead found that the only possible type of spot zoning 
that occurred in that case was type one spot zoning. 
Accordingly, the District Court's interpretation of the Taylor decision does not square 
with the facts of the case. Moreover, as set forth above, the District Court's interpretation of 
Taylor and the District Court's consequent ruling do not make sense because they would make 
type two spot zoning a nullity contrary to this Court's long line of cases recognizing type two 
spot zoning. See e.g., Taylor, 147 Idaho at 436-437, 210 P.3d at 544-545; Evans, 139 Idaho at 
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76, 73 P.3d at 89; Dawson, 98 Idaho at 514, 567 P.2d at 1265. Under the District Court's ruling 
a zoning decision that meets the type one test is valid even if it constitutes type two spot zoning 
and if the zoning decision does not meet the type one test, there would be no need to determine 
the zoning decision's validity under the type two test because it is invalid under the type one test. 
The Taylor decision cannot be read to require such a result and as set forth in footnote 3 above, 
the District Court's interpretations would create an illogical "Catch 22" loophole wherein there is 
neither type one nor type two spot zoning in Payette County for power plants. Such a loophole 
cannot be allowed to stand. Consequently, the Court should reject the District Court's 
interpretation and should reverse the District Court's decision. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Determined the Notice and Hearing Procedure 
Complied with LLUPA and the Payette County Code 
The proceedings conducted by the County were fundamentally unfair to the Petitioners, 
violated the notice requirements of I.C. §§ 67-6509 and 67-6511, violated the County's hearing 
procedures as codified at Payette County Code § 1-7-2A, and otherwise deprived the Petitioners 
of their due process rights. Among the defects in the proceedings conducted by the County, as 
detailed in Part III above, are (1) failing to include a summary of AEHI's application for 
approval of a nuclear power plant and a description of the affected land sufficient for 
identification in the published and mailed hearing notices, (2) improperly shortening the time for 
interested persons to submit written testimony and evidence in opposition to AEHI's application, 
(3) withholding AEHI's proposed development agreement from the public thereby preventing 
effective review and comment on it until just prior to the public hearings, and ( 4) favoring AEHI 
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by permitting it essentially unlimited time to make oral presentations to the Board while 
imposing strict time limits on the public. The District Court determined that neither the defective 
notice nor the conduct of the hearings violated Petitioners' due process rights. However, the 
District Court did not resolve or address H-Hook's claim that the Board violated H-Hook's due 
process rights by failing to make the development agreement available for public review on a 
timely basis thereby preventing H-Hook and other affected persons from having an adequate 
opportunity to review and present informed written comments and testimony concerning the 
agreement. H-Hook seeks a determination of that issue from this Court. 
1. The Development Agreement was the Most Critical Element of AEHl's 
Application. 
As noted above, AEHI' s rezone request is coupled with a development agreement. The 
development agreement is intended to, among other matters, set forth the conditions upon which 
a rezone might be granted. In the words of the Payette County Code: 
"The purpose of a development agreement is to provide a means for 
development in areas where, in the opinion of the board of county commissioners, 
a rezone by itself may not insure that the requirement set forth in the zoning 
ordinance or the subdivision ordinance will be complied with after a rezone has 
been approved; but, that a development agreement will assure compliance with 
the zoning and subdivision ordinances and with any required findings, 
conclusions and order allowing a rezone and with the oral representations and 
agreements of the rezone applicant." 
Payette County Code § 8-5-11 :B. The development agreement is a critical element of AEHI' s 
application because if the property is rezoned, AEHI, or anyone else who might acquire the 
subject property, will have the right to construct a nuclear power plant without further zoning 
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action, approval or control by the County, except to the extent that right is limited or conditioned 
by the development agreement. 
The development agreement presents the only opportunity for the County to establish 
requirements for what AEHI must do, and cannot do, in connection with the development of the 
power plant. It is the County's only opportunity to establish the parameters within which the 
development of the proposed power plant might proceed and to set forth how the interests of the 
County and its citizens, especially the neighboring property owners, will be preserved and 
protected. The development agreement is the document that binds AEHI as it moves forward 
with its project and is the document that the County may look to and rely upon to assure that the 
power plant project is being developed in accordance with the County's desires. 
The development agreement, and the conditions of approval attached to it, address, 
among other issues: (1) the timing and sequence of development and the timing and manner in 
which the County will be informed as development progresses; (2) the means of access to the 
project site both during construction and after completion and how use of area roads and access 
to the properties of neighboring owners will be protected; (3) what transportation facility 
improvements are required to adequately serve the project, how those needs will be determined, 
who is responsible to provide those improvements and when; (4) what public safety (police, fire, 
emergency medical) services will be required to serve the project and neighboring property 
owners, how those needs will be determined, who is responsible to provide those services and 
how; and (5) how the vast quantities of water required to safely operate a nuclear power plant 
will be provided to and stored on the site, where the water will come from and what effect that 
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will have on the water rights of neighboring property owners; and how those issues will be 
determined. Ag. R. p. 4098-4136. 
Affecting the content of the development agreement and the conditions of approval 
attached to it is also the one and only way that interested persons, such as H-Hook, can seek to 
protect themselves and their properties from the detrimental effects of the proposed power plant 
project. If the development agreement does not include provisions which appropriately protect 
the interests of neighboring property owners, the only opportunity to protect those interests is 
lost. Thus, if the rezone is upheld, the development agreement becomes the single most 
important element of the County's decision. 
It was not a simple task to attempt to understand how the power plant project would 
affect the County in general and H-Hook's interests in particular. AEHI's application consisted 
of 1,173 pages, including an 85 page narrative, a 403 page Site Review Report. The report 
addressed over 30 highly technical topics, including environmental impacts, socioeconomic 
impacts, health and safety issues, hydrogeology, electrical power transmission, water supply, 
emergency planning and other topics. Ag. R. p. 1-1173. Additionally, AEHI's application 
included other technical studies and documents including a Natural Resource Benefit Summary 
Report, a Transportation Assessment Summary, an Economic, Tax Revenue and Public Service 
Impact Study, a School Facility Study, a Water Availability Study and a Soil Resource Report, 
among others. Even AEHI's President recognized the challenge, describing the application as "a 
massive one .... Probably the largest in Idaho history." December 2, 2010, Transcript p. 58. 
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The development agreement, as finally adopted, was 38 pages in length and incorporated 
56 conditions of approval (Ag. R. p. 4098-4136), all of which needed review and analysis in light 
of all the information provided in AEHI's application and other relevant information. It was 
unreasonable to expect that H-Hook and other interested persons could complete such a review 
and analysis in the few days they had access to the development agreement. 
2. H-Hook was Denied Adequate Time to Review the Development Agreement. 
The P&Z Commission's published notice declared that a proposed development 
agreement would be added to the public record by November 17, 2010 (Ag. R. p. 1342), a week 
after the notice was published. Ag. R. p. 1343. In spite of that notice, the development 
agreement was not actually included in the public record and made available for public review 
until November 24, 2010, one day before the Thanksgiving holiday, two days before the cutoff 
date for written comment and just eight days before the public hearing. Ag. R. p. 3255. As a 
result, H-Hook was effectively denied adequate time for a careful and thorough review of the 
lengthy development agreement in conjunction with the 1, 173 page application necessary to 
prepare informed written comment for the P&Z Commission hearing. This failure to timely file 
the proposed development agreement made it essentially impossible for H-Hook to comment on 
the most important aspect of AEHI' s application. 
Delayed submittal of the development agreement for public review was repeated before 
the Board. In that instance, the proposed development agreement, as revised after the date of the 
P&Z Commission's recommendation for approval, was not prepared and made available for 
review by members of the public until May 26, 2011, when it was released with the County's 
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staff report only eleven days prior to the June 6 hearing date. Ag. R. p. 4028-4029. Once again, 
H-Hook was effectively denied adequate time to sufficiently review the lengthy development 
agreement and prepare informed written comment on it. This seriously hindered H-Hook's 
ability to prepare for the Board's public hearing and thus, violated H-Hook's due process rights. 
3. The County's Failure to Timely Provide the Development Agreement 
Violated H-Hook's Due Process Rights. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Johnson v. City of Homedale, 118 Idaho 285, 796 P.2d 
162 (Ct. App. 1990) held that the requirement that interested persons be given adequate notice of 
a request to change the authorized use for a particular parcel of property, includes the 
requirement that all materials required to be submitted with an application for such a change of 
use be made available for review in advance of the hearing, otherwise "citizens are left with a 
dearth of information on whether-and in what regard-to object to the proposal." 118 Idaho 
at 287. The purpose for the requirement is to put the public on notice of the important details of 
the proposal and give interested persons a meaningful opportunity to review and comment on 
that proposal. Making any such materials available at a later date prevents that opportunity for 
meaningful review and comment, the court concluded. 
This concept was also applied in Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 109 P.3d 
1091 (2005). There the applicant for a conditional use permit failed to submit the required 
engineer's report addressing certain avalanche safety issues, yet the city approved the permit 
subject to the condition that the required report would be submitted before a building permit 
could be issued. Finding that approval to be improper, this court noted: 
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"Without the certification of the licensed engineer at the public hearings 
leading to the issuance of the conditional use permit, the interested public has no 
meaningful chance to comment on the CUP's impact on community or other facts 
affecting surrounding property. The commission's two-step process of 'approval 
with conditions' prior to granting the CUP, nullifies the importance of the 
statutory public hearing required under I.C. § 67-6512(b)." 
141 Idaho at 3 5 5. This court further noted that under the system utilized by the City of Ketchum, 
"interested parties [sic] right to a public hearing is weakened or possibly nullified if those studies 
are not completed prior to the public hearing." Id. 
The same problem arises in this case. Here, the County effectively prevented any 
meaningful opportunity for H-Hook and other interested persons to review and comment on the 
proposed development agreement first by delaying its availability for review before the 
P&Z Commission's December 2, 2010, hearing and then again delaying availability of the 
revised version of it before the Board's June 6, 2011, hearing. H-Hook had no meaningful 
chance to carefully review and provide informed comment on the content of the development 
agreement and whether it adequately addressed the issues which were important to it. H-Hook's 
right to a public hearing was effectively nullified. Had the development agreement been made 
available for review and comment sufficiently in advance, H-Hook might have hired advisors to 
examine issues such as, for example, the impacts the project would have on vital transportation 
facilities serving its property and whether those impacts could be mitigated. 
For example, condition of approval 16 attached to the Development Agreement states: 
"Stone Quarry Road or any secondary emergency access shall be paved and designed and 
improved to meet AASHTO design standards .... " Ag. R. p. 4132. Stone Quarry Road exists 
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entirely on H-Hook private property for some of its length, and is the only roadway linking the 
southern sections of the H-Hook ranch property. Ag. R. p. 3688. Because of the insufficient 
time allowed for review of the development agreement, it was impossible for H-Hook to review 
the agreement or understand it on its own, or to retain expert advisors to review and explain what 
impact the paving and designing and improving of Stone Quarry Road "to meet AASHTO design 
standards" would have on its private property rights and its ranch operations. Because of the 
insufficient time allowed, H-Hook was denied the right to provide informed written comment on 
this very important issue directly affecting H-Hook. 
This Court has stated, "[i]t is a well settled principle that notice and hearing requirements 
in zoning enabling acts are conditions precedent to the proper exercise of the zoning authority." 
Citizens for Better Government v. Valley County, 95 Idaho 320, 322, 508 P.2d 550, 552 (1973). 
If a zoning action does not comply with the statutory notice requirements, it is invalid. "When 
the statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible effect of zoning law upon property rights 
... the statutory notice and hearing then becomes necessary in order to satisfy the requirements 
of due process and may not be dispensed with." Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 
684, 799 P.2d 969, 972 (1990). By failing to require that the most important document in 
AEHI's application be made available for review sufficiently in advance of the public hearing, 
the County has deprived H-Hook and others similarly situated of their due process rights to 
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard and provide informed written comment on 
AEHI's request. 
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More recently this Court has again emphasized that procedural due process requirements 
apply to proceedings on land use matters. 
"Generally, as a procedural matter, all the parties involved in a land-use 
decision have a substantial right to a reasonably fair decision-making process. 
Governing boards owe procedural fairness not just to applicants but also their 
interested opponents. Both should expect proceedings that are free from 
procedural defects that might reasonably have affected the final outcome. See 
Noble v. Kootenai Cnty., 148 Idaho 937, 942-43, 231 P.3d 1034, 1039-40 (2010) 
(holding that, even though the county board disallowed the public from 
participating in a site visit, doing so did not likely affect the decision); Eacret v. 
Bonner Cnty., 139 Idaho 780, 787, 86 P.3d 494, 501 (2004) (vacating a county 
board's decision due to a commissioner's likely bias). This includes the right for 
all interested parties to have a meaningful opportunity to present evidence to the 
governing board on salient factual issues. Cnty. Residents Against Pollution from 
Septic Sludge v. Bonner Cnty., 138 Idaho 585, 588-89, 67 P.3d 64, 67-68 (2003); 
Sanders Orchard v. Gem Cnty. ex rel. Bd of Cnty. Com 'rs, 137 Idaho 695, 702, 
52 P.3d 840, 847 (2002). 
"These cases align with the overarching due-process principle that 
everyone with a statutory interest in the outcome of a decision is entitled to 
meaningful notice and a fair hearing before an impartial decision-maker. Eacret, 
139 Idaho at 787, 86 P.3d at 501; see also Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 
150 Idaho 30, 244 P .3d 17 4, 180 (2010) (' [D]ue process rights are substantial 
rights.'). Accordingly, the Legislature has provided that people who are affected 
by land-use proceedings for the most part have a statutory right to notice and for a 
chance to participate in a hearing. E.g. I.C. § 67-6512(2) (requiring public notice 
and hearing for special-use permits); id. § 67-6515 (planned-unit developments; 
id. § 67-6516 (variances)." 
Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. of Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 232, 254 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2011 ). 
Here, H-Hook was deprived of a reasonably fair and meaningful opportunity to present evidence 
on salient issues relating to the proposed development agreement. 
AEHI and the County asked the District Court to excuse them from the requirement 
announced in Johnson v. City of Homedale, supra, by pointing out that drafts of the development 
agreement were available to the public in advance of the hearings. The first draft of the 
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development agreement which was available for review by H-Hook was submitted without any 
conditions of approval. Ag. R. p. 221. The next draft development agreement was, at the 
request of the P&Z Commission, being reviewed and revised by the County and its attorneys 
between the date of the P&Z Commission recommendation of approval and the date of the 
Board's public hearing. Ag. R. p. 4029. There is no way for the public in general, or H-Hook in 
particular, to know what changes were made (and what changes were not) until the final revised 
form of the development agreement was released for public review and comment. It could be 
that the development agreement remained largely unchanged or it could have been dramatically 
changed. It could have been made better from H-Hook's perspective or it could have been made 
worse. There was simply no way to know until the proposed development agreement was 
actually published. By the time it was published, the public in general and H-Hook in particular 
were afforded insufficient time to review, analyze and respond to the content of the development 
agreement. That is H-Hook's objection. As the court in Johnson v. City of Homedale, supra, 
stated, H-Hook was "left with a dearth of information on whether-and in what regard-to 
object to the proposal." 118 Idaho at 287. 
AEHI will undoubtedly argue here, as it did below, that in spite of the procedural defects, 
H-Hook had a reasonable opportunity to participate in the process and that in any event, H-Hook 
failed to show how its substantial rights were prejudiced. However, this Court has repeatedly 
recognized that due process rights are substantial rights. 
This is a relatively easy question in this case because due process rights 
are substantial rights. See Mitchell v. WT Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) 
('Due process of law guarantees no particular form of procedure; it protects 
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substantial rights.'). Thus, because Eddins has demonstrated that his due process 
rights have been violated by the City's actions, he has similarly demonstrated that 
a substantial right has been prejudiced for the purposes of Idaho Code section 
67-5279(3). 
Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 36, 244 P.3d 174, 180 (2010). See also Jasso v. 
Camas County, 151 Idaho 790,796,264 P.3d 897,903(2011). 
This Court has occasionally recognized instances where procedural defects have not risen 
to the level of prejudice to a substantial right. However, as the Court noted in Jasso, those cases 
are readily distinguishable from the present case. The procedural defects in those cases, this 
Court noted, were relatively minor. 151 Idaho 796-797, 264 P .3d at 903-904. In this case, 
however, the defects were significant. The single most important document to be considered by 
the Board in making its decision to rezone the subject property for development of a nuclear 
power plant, the one document which would shape the Board's approval and would set forth how 
H-Hook's legitimate interests would be protected and its property rights preserved, was withheld 
from H-Hook until it was too late to effectively comment on it. And, more importantly, the 
application in this case is not for just another subdivision plat or gravel pit. The application here 
is for a nuclear power plant, a proposed use which contemplates what might be the single biggest 
construction project ever to be undertaken in the state of Idaho4, and, if constructed, a project 
4 According to AEHI and its consultants, the construction of the plant on the 500 acre site is 
expected to last up to four (4) years (Ag. R. p. 657; December 2, 2010, Transcript p. 29), at a 
cost of between $7 Billion (Ag. R. p. 657) and $10 Billion (December 2, 2010, Transcript p. 57). 
The project will employ as many as 5,000 direct construction workers. Ag. R. p. 657. Those 
workers will construct 21 buildings approaching one million sq. ft. in area and up to 234' in 
height. Ag. R. p. 18. The project also contemplates the construction of as many as 60 miles of 
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which will impact persons and properties in the ten mile radius Emergency Planning Zone 
described in Part III, above. 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. In short, this proposal presents as 
important a decision as the Board will ever make and as serious a threat to H-Hook's property 
rights as will likely ever arise. 
It is well established that due process is not a rigid set of rules. Rather, it is a flexible 
concept calling for such procedural protections as are warranted by the particular situation. 
Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley Cnty., 145 Idaho 121, 127, 176 P.3d 126, 132 
(2007), citing to Cowan v. Bd. of Com'rs of Fremont Cnty., 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 
(2006). The failure to make the development agreement available sufficiently in advance of the 
hearing so that affected persons might make informed comment on it clearly risks deprivation of 
the very interests sought to be protected by the requirement for notice and hearing-the 
opportunity to affect the outcome of the decision making process. H-Hook and the other 
appellants had requested in the February 2012 appeal to the Board that AEHI and the County 
give proper notice to all parties that may be affected by the proposed plant. The request was 
ignored, although making the development agreement available to H-Hook for comment for a 
reasonable period of time prior to the public hearing would not have placed a significant burden 
on AEHI and the County. The minimum requirement is that the development agreement, in its 
proposed final form, must be available for review and comment when notice is mailed and 
electrical transmission lines (December 2, 2010, Transcript p. 26) and between 6 ½ and 24 miles 
of 6 foot diameter pipe (or two 42" diameter pipes) to deliver cooling water to the site from 
either the Snake River or the Payette River. Ag. R. p. 759-766; June 6, 2011, Transcript 
p. 21-22. 
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published prior to the required public hearing. Clearly, the magnitude of the approval of a 
nuclear power plant and its effect on H-Hook's and others private property rights requires that 
AEHI and the County comply with all procedural requirements. 
D. H-Hook is Entitled to Its Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
If the Court rules for H-Hook, H-Hook should be awarded its attorneys' fees and costs 
pursuant to I. C. § 12-117, which permits the prevailing or partially prevailing party to recover 
reasonable attorney fees and other reasonable expenses from the non-prevailing party if the 
Court finds that the non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, and in 
accordance with Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 
VI. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the District Court's decision upholding the conditional rezone must be 
reversed, and the Board's approval of the conditional rezone vacated, because the conditional 
rezone is based upon an invalid comprehensive plan, constitutes illegal spot zoning, and because 
the hearing process was illegally rendered unfair by several due process violations affecting 
substantial rights. 
t'h 
DATED this l 3 day of March, 2014. 
WILLIAMS BRADBURY, P.C. ANDERSEN BANDUCCI PLLC 
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Attorneys for Petitioners-Appellants 
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